

Access control delegation for the Cloud

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Why do enterprises fear the cloud?



“Uncertain ability to enforce provider security policies”

“[Lack of] effective models for managing and enforcing data access policies”



Interoperability requires complex APIs which increases chances of a security breach due to implementation errors

We need a solution that...

- Performs access control on outsourced data
- Requires minimum trust to cloud providers
- Protects user credentials
- Is easy to implement
- Enables migration to other cloud providers
- Provides privacy and prevents monitoring

A new approach

- Separate data storage from data access authorization
 - Cloud providers are concerned with data storage
 - Data access authorization performed by a trusted (not always third) party: the Access Control Provider

Scheme Overview




Data Owner




Access Control
Provider


Scheme Overview




Scheme Overview




Scheme Overview




Scheme Overview




Scheme Overview




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


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


Schen

- Verify signature
- Check if URI_{ACP} , Pub_{CP} are correct
- Check lifetime
- Check level



Scheme Overview



Revisiting our requirements

- ✓ Performs access control on outsourced data
- ✓ Requires minimum trust on cloud providers
 - The cloud provider is only trusted to respect the decision of the ACP
 - Relaxed form of existing trust relationships
- ✓ Protects user credentials
- ✓ Easy to implement, allows migration
 - Data can be copied-pasted
- ✓ Provides privacy
 - The cloud provider learns nothing about users

...And some additional benefits

- Policies are reusable
 - The Content Provider does not know how policies work (useful for e.g. for B2B applications)
- Policies can be modified without the involvement of the cloud providers
- ACPs create the potentials of a new market

Why not OpenID or OAuth?

- OpenID
 - Identity Provider checks user credentials
 - But the Cloud Provider checks the policy
 - The Cloud Provider knows who the user is
- OAuth
 - Identity Manager verifies user attributes
 - But the Cloud Provider checks policy attributes
 - The Cloud Provider knows the user attributes

Attacks deflected

- Attack scenarios by Wang et al., SSP 2012
- Switching policy from legal A to illegal B
 - The ACP includes the policy in the signature
- Cloud provider B seeing data in provider A
 - The ACP includes B's key in the signature
- Pretending to be another user of the system
 - The CP knows who asked for each token
 - This worked on facebook and twitter...

Implementation



- On top of Swift (object storage system)
 - Component in Swift pipeline
 - Uses HTTPS for communication

Middleware for



Google Drive



Thank you

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