



Blockchains and Authorization in Constrained IoT Environments

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Motivation and challenges



- Why constrained IoT environments ?
- Why or why not blockchains ? Which type of blockchain ?
- Goal: identify and quantify tradeoffs in terms of **transaction cost, transaction delay, trust, and privacy**

Challenges

- Transaction cost and delay
- Fully decentralized solution
- Ensuring that IoT devices actually provide promised access
- Constrained client devices & constrained IoT resource devices

*Single public ledger
not enough*

*Blockchain interaction
with real world is a
challenge*



Why constrained IoT environments?



- Because many IoT devices are constrained in terms of
 - processing and storage resources
 - network connectivity
- } Reducing usage also **reduces power consumption** & **security threats**

Scalability of IoT systems ***can be addressed***
by utilizing device-to-device communication

Device-to-device technologies ***exist***
and are ***becoming mature***

New challenge: how to achieve ***trusted***
device-to-device communication




Why/which type of blockchains?

- **Decentralized trust**, i.e. no single trusted third party
 - Public ledgers: *wide-scale decentralized trust*
 - Permissioned ledgers: *degree of trust* determined by permissioned set
- **Immutability**
 - related to first point, majority of nodes need to agree to change state
 - depending on scenario, can be achieved by other means
- **Transparency**
 - not only a feature but a *requirement* for decentralized trust
 - tradeoff with *privacy*
- **Availability**, through *decentralized storage and execution*
 - can be achieved other ways




Constrained IoT resources

- IoT resource has limited processing, storage and only D2D connectivity
- Authorization Server (AS) handles requests on behalf of IoT resource
 - OAuth 2.0 authorization framework
 - Based on access tokens
- Client and AS always connected and can interact with blockchain






Two approaches with one blockchain



1. Record only hashes




2. Smart Contract



Single blockchain: execution cost




- Smart contract requires 2.5 times EVM gas compared to simply recording hashes
- Only write transactions cost gas
 - Reading data has zero cost
- Quantifies cost for higher functionality of smart contracts
 - Authorization policies & logic







Smart contracts and two blockchains



1. Record only hashes



2. Smart Contract




3. Smart Contract & two blockchains



Execution cost




- Two blockchains achieve lower cost compared to one
 - Only payment transaction on public ledger
- Tradeoffs
 - Two ledgers: **trust, transparency, and privacy** for authorization transactions determined by **permissioned node set**
 - Public ledger: **wide-scale decentralized trust and transparency**






Disconnected resource & ~~connected~~ client

- Up to now assumed that client
 - has continuous connectivity
 - Interacts directly with blockchain
- Client AS can, on behalf of client,
 - interact with ledger
 - Interact with IoT resource AS
- Client must obtain authorization information from client AS at some prior instance (asynchronously)



Connected resource & disconnected client

- Connected IoT resource acts as relay for disconnected client






Challenges


- High cost & delay incurred by blockchains
 - Due to public ledger
 - Combining public & private/permissioned ledgers can provide different tradeoffs of cost, trust, and privacy
 - Off-chain transactions: unidirectional payment channels sufficient for some IoT applications
- Single AS
 - Blockchain advantages are limited to assets & transactions residing in the blockchain
 - Once we traverse blockchain boundaries we lose these benefits
 - Solely adding multiple ASes not a solution because IoT resource not directly connected to blockchain
 - Need processing at client to reduce data & ensure trust with constrained IoT resource

Move smart contract to
permissioned ledger
and/or only record
hashes on public ledger

Smart contract on
public ledger



Achieved by combining public
with private/permissioned ledger







Challenges (cont)



- Trust that resource indeed provides access
 - Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as ARM's TrustZone, Intel's SGX, Keystone (open source RISC V)
- Constrained clients
 - Need client proxy/agent (analogous to AS acting as proxy of IoT resource)



IoT resource
with TEE



Further info: <https://mm.aueb.gr/blockchains/>