

# Rippler: Delay Injection for Service Dependency Detection

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**Abstract**—Detecting dependencies among network services has been well-studied in previous research. These attempts at service dependency detection fall into two classes: active and passive approaches. While passive approaches suffer from high false positives, active approaches suffer from applicability problems.

In this paper, we design a new application-independent active approach for detecting dependencies among services. We present a traffic watermarking approach with arbitrarily low false positives and easy applicability. We provide statistical tests for detecting watermarked flows, and we compute the false positive and false negative rates of these tests both analytically and experimentally.

Furthermore, we implemented the proposed watermarking system (*Rippler*) in a small university lab network. We ran our system for four months and detected 38 dependencies among 54 services. Finally, we compared the efficiency of our approach against three previous systems by testing them on this real-world network data.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate and governmental computer networks are targets of constant attacks [16]. Although the attackers targeting these networks may have different incentives, goals, and techniques, they generally target the same aspects of the system: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. While confidentiality and integrity properties have historically attracted more attention from the security community, the availability property has been comparatively neglected.

We depend on network services for many of our daily needs (e.g., Internet banking, personal accounting, social networking, and medical services). The ubiquity and diversity of network services have led to an ever-increasing complexity of the infrastructure supporting these services. As engineers use divide-and-conquer to attack complexity, these services are implemented as composite modules, built of multiple, simpler, underlying services. This modular approach enables designers to reuse standard services to build complex customized ones. For example, a webmail service is usually implemented using several simple modules including a web service, an email service, and a DNS service.

This modular design paradigm has security and reliability implications. On the one hand, the modular design along with reusing and sharing modules makes it challenging to determine a distributed system's perimeters. This, in turn, can lead to insecure network topology design. On the other hand, the modular design makes it challenging to prioritize security events and assets, to correlate security alerts, to generate attack graphs, and to provide situational awareness.

As services become more complex and increasingly distributed, protecting them becomes more challenging. Because there are more components that can fail and make the whole service unavailable, distributed systems are generally more difficult to protect. One needs to know the components of a composite service to be able to protect it. Unfortunately, these implementation and dependency details are often undocumented and difficult to identify in complex networks.

An example of a composite service is a webmail service. A typical client checks her email using a web interface, by first contacting a DNS server to acquire the IP address of the webserver. The webserver, in turn, contacts a Kerberos server to authenticate the user, an Active Directory server to load the user's contact list, a MySQL server to load the user's profile, and an SMTP server to send the user's email. If any of the involved services fail, the final webmail service will fail or will be degraded. The system administrator needs to know the dependencies between the involved services to be able to adequately protect the webmail service.

Previous work on service dependency detection can be divided into active [10] and passive [14] approaches. Passive approaches do not generate any additional traffic. They simply observe the existing traffic and find the set of services that exhibit correlated activity. Active approaches, on the other hand, manipulate the timing or the contents of the traffic to identify dependencies. Each of these approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages.

Passive approaches suffer from two main problems: higher false positive rates and the inability to detect the direction of the dependency relations (who depends on whom). These problems result from the fact that "correlation does not imply causation." In other words, when two services are correlated with each other it does not necessarily mean that they depend on each other. For example, two services may depend on and be influenced by a third service, and that is the reason why their activities are correlated. Noise and jitters in a real-world network can also cause occasional spurious correlated activity in the services. This problem leads to the detection of false dependencies (false positives). Even when one service depends on a second one, the correlation does not show which service depends on the other.

Active approaches are harder to apply, as they require higher level of access to the individual systems, require more modifications to the system, and are usually application dependent, and they may even introduce more load into the network (e.g., by adding tags to application-specific traffic). The high level of access and high level of modification to the network that are required by active approaches make their application in a real production system, at the very least, challenging.

Moreover, application-dependent approaches cannot be used for detecting dependencies between unknown types of services.

In this paper, we provide an active watermarking approach that is application-independent and inflicts minimal burden on the network. To detect dependencies, we create temporal perturbation patterns in request arrival timings for different services, and we determine whether or not these patterns propagate to other services. We provide an analytical framework to interpret the results of the experiments using statistical inference. More specifically, we use three different statistical tests to show the existence of the dependency relationship. We analytically show that any desirable level of accuracy can be achieved if the experiment running time is long enough. We implemented a watermarking system, called *Rippler*. Finally, we deployed this watermarking system in a university computer laboratory network and detected 38 dependencies.

Our approach requires the ability to selectively delay packets and access to a network dataset that contains information about each individual network connection start and end time. Any frequently used network traffic dump format, such as NetFlow [7] records or tcpdump, contains the required information about the network connections.

Our contributions are the following:

- We provide a novel application-independent flow-watermarking approach for detecting service dependencies.
- We provide statistical models of the watermarking approach and provide three statistical tests for detecting service dependencies. We show that the suggested tests can achieve arbitrarily small error probabilities given large-enough data samples.
- We implemented a flow-watermarking system, and we installed it in a university department network and analyzed the gathered data. Our system detected 38 dependencies using this system, some of which were not previously identified by the system administrators.
- We compared the results of our approach to three previous works in dependency detection. We showed that *Rippler* outperformed the passive approaches and produced outputs with high levels of confidence.

## II. SERVICE DEPENDENCY

In this paper, we define a network service as a process running on a host and serving requests destined to a network socket (triple of IP address, port number, and protocol). We define dependency among services as follows. A service  $S_2$  depends on service  $S_1$  if a delay, degradation, or failure in service  $S_1$  leads to a failure, disruption, or degradation of the service of  $S_2$ , directly or indirectly. Services can have different types of dependencies between each other. Chen et al. [6] classified network service dependencies into two classes: local-remote and remote-remote dependencies. Service  $S_1$  has a local-remote dependency on service  $S_2$  if  $S_1$ , to serve its clients, needs to contact  $S_2$ . Service  $S_2$  has a remote-remote dependency on service  $S_1$  if a remote client, to access service  $S_2$ , needs to access service  $S_1$  first.

**Figure 1:** Local-Remote vs. Remote-Remote Dependency




Figure 1 shows examples of remote-remote and local-remote dependencies. The graphs in this figure show the execution order of a request. The X-axis is the time axis. The graph shows the order of execution and request-response. A horizontal line shows local execution on one machine, while a downward line from one machine to the other means the first machine sent a request to the second one and is waiting for the response, and an upward line from a machine to another shows that a response has been returned.

Figure 1(a) depicts a local-remote dependency between service 1 and service 2. In this figure, the client connects to service  $S_1$ . Service  $S_1$  in turn connects to service  $S_2$ . When service  $S_2$  replies to the request from  $S_1$ ,  $S_1$  computes and returns the appropriate response to the request from the client.

Figure 1(b) shows a remote-remote dependency. In this figure, the client connects to server  $S_1$  to request a service. The response from  $S_1$  enables the client to connect to  $S_2$ .


Certainly, one can imagine more complicated types of dependencies, but they can be generalized by considering the fact that dependencies are transitive relationships. In other words, if  $S_3$  depends on  $S_2$ , and  $S_2$  depends on  $S_1$ ,  $S_3$  also indirectly depends on  $S_1$ .

To express the transitivity property of the dependency relationship, we define the following:  $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$  means that service  $S_1$  depends on service  $S_2$  (either by a local-remote or a remote-remote dependency).  $S_1 \xrightarrow{L} S_2$  means that service  $S_1$  depends on service  $S_2$ , and this dependency is a local-remote dependency. Similarly,  $S_1 \xrightarrow{R} S_2$  means that service  $S_1$  depends on service  $S_2$  and this dependency is a remote-remote dependency. Using this formalization, the transitivity of the dependency relation can be expressed as:

$$\begin{cases} \left( S_1 \xrightarrow{L} S_2 \right) \wedge (S_2 \rightarrow S_3) \Rightarrow S_1 \xrightarrow{L} S_3 \\ \left( S_1 \xrightarrow{R} S_2 \right) \wedge (S_2 \rightarrow S_3) \Rightarrow S_1 \xrightarrow{R} S_3 \end{cases}$$

This property can lead to non-trivial dependencies among services that one would not suspect may depend on each other.

It should be noted that a service  $S_1$  can have, at the same time, both local-remote and remote-remote dependencies on service  $S_2$ . For example, a webserver that is acting as a web proxy can have a remote-remote dependency on a DNS server, because the clients need to contact the DNS server to acquire

**Figure 2: Effect of delays**

the webserver's IP address before contacting the webserver. Moreover, this webserver also has a local-remote dependency on the DNS server, because it needs to contact the DNS server to acquire the IP address of the website requested by the proxy user.

In this paper, we detect both direct and indirect dependencies using a watermarking approach.

### III. WATERMARKING FOR DEPENDENCY DETECTION


Although watermarking has been widely used for deanonymization purposes, applying the same techniques to detect service dependencies is far from trivial. The reason is that deanonymization methods match pairs of connections carrying the same information to each other, while dependency detection systems match services whose connections are causally related, and not usually carrying the same information.

When two services depend on each other, we expect that a delay in connection to one service will result in a similar delay in connection to the other service. However, the way in which the delay propagates and its direction depend on the type of the dependency. Interestingly, this fact can be used to further distinguish the type of the dependency between services.

As mentioned earlier, service  $S_2$  has a remote-remote dependency on service  $S_1$ <sup>1</sup> if clients need to contact service  $S_1$  before contacting service  $S_2$ . A classic example is a client that needs to contact a DNS service before contacting a webserver. In this case, a delay in the beginning of the connection to the DNS service ( $S_1$ ) results in a similar delay of the start time of a connection to the webserver ( $S_2$ ). On the other hand, a delay in the beginning of a connection to the webserver ( $S_2$ ) does not have any effect on the connections to the DNS service ( $S_1$ ). Figure 2(a) illustrates this concept.

Service  $S_1$  has a local-remote dependency on the service  $S_2$  if service  $S_1$  contacts service  $S_2$  whenever it is contacted by a client. An example of a local-remote dependency is a webserver that needs to contact a MySQL server to load the contents for satisfying a client request. In this case, a delay of the beginning of a connection to  $S_1$  results in a similar delay of the start time of a connection to  $S_2$ . In addition, a delay of the start of a connection to  $S_2$  results in a similar delay of the

<sup>1</sup>Throughout the paper, the service that has to be contacted first will be called  $S_1$ .

**Figure 3: Delayer effect on connections**

end time of a connection to  $S_1$ . Figure 2(b) shows this type of dependency.

To leverage these properties to detect dependencies, we need to detect the resulting delay in the depending service. In the next section, we provide the required modeling and statistical framework for detecting the propagated delay.

### IV. INDUCED PERTURBATION MODEL

To detect dependency relations, we create delay patterns that statistically stand out and can be distinguished from random variations.

#### A. Detection of the Injected Delay

To detect the dependency relations, we need to detect artificially-injected delays. Assume the following scenario: A connection  $C_1$  to service  $S_1$  is delayed. As a result, service  $S_1$  will contact service  $S_2$  through connection  $C_2$  with a delay (For the sake of simplicity, we assume a local-remote dependency. A similar argument can be used when a remote-remote dependency exists between the services). The observer will see these two connections, along with thousands of other connections, and may not be able to recognize the two connections  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  as being causally related.

To make the perturbation visible to the observer, we create different patterns in the request arrival times at a selected service. These patterns are different in different time windows, but result in similar patterns in the related service.

To model the service activity, we divide the observation period into time windows of equal size ( $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_{2n}$ , where  $|w_i| = s_w$ , in which  $s_w$  is the window size, and  $2n$  is the number of time windows). We delay the requests directed to service  $S_1$  for  $t_d$  in odd time windows

$w_1, w_3, w_5, \dots, w_{2n-1}$  and we do not delay them in even time windows. This process will create time windows with more than average requests ( $t_b$  busy time window) and time windows with less than average requests ( $t_i$  idle time window) on  $S_2$  (also referred to as *ripples*), as shown in Figure 3. It is straightforward to show that the size of idle time windows and busy time windows is equal to the amount of delay ( $t_i = t_b = t_d$ ). The smaller the time window size, the more samples can be gathered during a fixed period of time. On the other hand, the time window size,  $s_w$ , should be large enough to separate the effects of consecutive tests and make the samples independent of each other. In other words, the delayed packets (and the connections triggered by them) should have enough time to reach their destination before the next period of delaying starts.

Let's assume that the number of requests for service  $S_2$  in different time windows ( $t_d$ ) follows an unknown distribution  $D_0 = D(\mu_0, \sigma_0)$ , with the mean and standard deviation equal to  $\mu_0$  and  $\sigma_0$ , respectively. Also, assume that  $\rho$  is the fraction of requests destined to  $S_2$  that are caused by requests destined to  $S_1$ .

When requests destined to  $S_1$  are delayed in the described way, the number of requests in the idle time windows and busy time windows on  $S_2$  follow

$D_1 = D(\mu_0 \cdot (1 - \rho), \sigma_0 \cdot (1 - \rho))$  and  $D_2 = D(\mu_0 \cdot (1 + \rho), \sigma_0 \cdot (1 + \rho))^2$ , respectively. In other words, this watermarking results in consecutive periods of length  $t_d$  of distributions  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  separated from each other by periods of length  $w - t_d$ . The request arrival distribution for the time period between the busy and idle time periods follows distribution  $D_0$ . In the next section, we show how these artificially-generated patterns can be distinguished from random noise with high levels of confidence.

## V. STATISTICAL INFERENCE

To show the dependency of two services, we want to reject the hypothesis that two services are independent. Therefore, we use statistical hypothesis testing for showing the existence of the dependency relationship. First, we assume that the given services are independent. In other words, injecting delays in one service does not alter the request arrival time distribution on the second one (null hypothesis). Then, we compute the conditional probability of the observed request arrival time samples, given the null hypothesis. If the probability of the observed sample, given the null hypothesis, is lower than a threshold, the null hypothesis is rejected and the dependency between services is assumed.

While we use the described request delaying scheme, we use different statistical tests for comparing the means of the two populations and to reject the null hypothesis, including: *two independent samples means t-test*, *two dependent samples means (paired) t-test*, and *two dependent samples (Wilcoxon) signed rank test*.

To simplify the formalization, and without loss of generality, we assume that we want to determine the relationship between services  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , while we are delaying requests destined to  $S_1$ . To describe the experiment, we use the following variable definitions:

$X$  is the random variable for the number of requests arriving to service  $S_2$  in each time window of length  $t_d$ , when no delay is applied<sup>3</sup>.

$X^i$  and  $X^b$  are the random variables for the number of requests arriving for service  $S_2$  in each  $t_i$  and  $t_b$  time windows, respectively.

$\mu_i$  and  $\mu_b$  are the mean of  $X^i$  and  $X^b$ , respectively.

Our null hypothesis is that the busy and idle time windows have the same average request arrival rates:  $H_0 \equiv \mu_i = \mu_b$ . The null hypothesis states that  $S_2$  is independent of  $S_1$ , and, as a result, injecting delays to requests to  $S_1$  does not change the request arrival distribution in  $S_2$  ( $H_0 \Rightarrow \mu_i = \mu_b$  or

equivalently  $\mu_i \neq \mu_b \Rightarrow H_1$ ).

We describe several statistical tests to calculate  $Pr(e|\mu_i = \mu_b)$ , in which  $e$  is an observed test statistic. In the rest of this section, we describe each statistical test and its properties.

### A. Two Independent Samples Means t-Test

This test computes the probability that the distributions from which two samples are drawn have the same means.

The p-value of the 2-sample t-test is calculated using the following formula:

$$t = \frac{(\overline{X^b} - \overline{X^i}) - (\mu_b - \mu_i)}{\sqrt{\frac{S_b^2}{n_b} + \frac{S_i^2}{n_i}}}$$

$$H_0 \Rightarrow \mu_i - \mu_b = 0 \Rightarrow t = \frac{\overline{X^b} - \overline{X^i}}{\sqrt{\frac{S_b^2}{n_b} + \frac{S_i^2}{n_i}}} \text{ follows t-distribution}$$

with  $df = n_b + n_i - 2$  degrees of freedom, where,

$$S_p^2 = \frac{(n_b - 1) \cdot S_b^2 + (n_i - 1) \cdot S_i^2}{n_b + n_i - 2} \text{ and } S_i^2 = \frac{SS_i}{n_i - 1} \text{ and } S_b^2 = \frac{SS_b}{n_b - 1}.$$

We already showed that if  $S_1 \xrightarrow{L} S_2 \vee S_2 \xrightarrow{R} S_1$ ,  $\mu_i = \mu_0 \cdot (1 - \rho)$  and  $\mu_b = \mu_0 \cdot (1 + \rho)$ . Using the *central limit theorem*, it can be shown that, regardless of how small  $\rho$  is, an arbitrarily small p-value can be obtained given a large-enough set of samples. In other words, the following holds:

$$H_1 \Rightarrow \mu_b \neq \mu_i \Rightarrow \begin{cases} \overline{X^b} - \overline{X^i} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} \mu_b - \mu_i \\ \sqrt{\frac{S_b^2}{n_b} + \frac{S_i^2}{n_i}} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \Rightarrow t = \frac{\overline{X^b} - \overline{X^i}}{\sqrt{\frac{S_b^2}{n_b} + \frac{S_i^2}{n_i}}} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} \pm \infty \Rightarrow p\text{-value} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0.$$

On the other hand, if the two services are independent, regardless of the size of the sample, we will not see small p-values. To summarize, this test is reliable as long as a large-enough sample set is available. However, this test is sensitive to noise, because a small number of data points with extreme values can skew considerably the test results.

Given a desired false positive rate ( $\alpha$ ) and false negative rate ( $\beta$ ), the required sample size can be calculated by:  $N = \frac{\sigma^2 (\frac{n_b + n_i}{n_b} + \frac{n_b + n_i}{n_i}) (Z_\alpha + Z_\beta)^2}{(\mu_b - \mu_i)^2}$  [13]

### B. Two Dependent Samples Means Paired t-Test

The number of requests that arrive at  $S_2$  in each idle time window ( $x^i$ ) is related or dependent on its neighbor (consecutive) busy time window ( $x^b$ ), as servers have different load/request arrival behavior during different times of the day. Unfortunately, the *two independent samples means* test does not take advantage of this property.

If we consider each consecutive value of  $t_i$  and  $t_b$  to be related samples, we can use the paired sample t-test. If we define  $D = X^b - X^i$ , the following variable, t ratio, follows Student's t distribution with  $df = n - 1$ <sup>4</sup>:

$$t = \frac{\overline{D}}{\frac{S_D}{\sqrt{n}}} = \frac{\overline{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{SS_D}{n(n-1)}}} \quad [8]$$

<sup>4</sup>df: degree of freedom

<sup>2</sup>If  $X \sim D(\mu_x, \sigma_x)$  and  $Y = aX$  then  $\mu_y = a \cdot \mu_x$  and  $\sigma_y = \sqrt{\frac{\sum (y_i - \mu_y)^2}{n}} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum (a \cdot x_i - a \cdot \mu_x)^2}{n}} = a \cdot \sigma_x$

<sup>3</sup>We use sliding time windows

It should be noted that if the null hypothesis is not true, increasing the size of the sample set increases the power of the test.

$$H_1 \Rightarrow \mu_b \neq \mu_i \Rightarrow \begin{cases} \bar{D} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} \mu_b - \mu_i \\ \sqrt{\frac{SS_D}{n(n-1)}} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \\ \Rightarrow t = \frac{\bar{D}}{\sqrt{\frac{SS_D}{n(n-1)}}} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} \pm \infty \Rightarrow p\text{-value} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0$$

Therefore, the power of this test increases as the number of samples increases. This property is important, because if  $\mu_b - \mu_i$  is relatively small, the difference between the distributions can still be distinguished by increasing the size of the sample set (i.e., by running the experiment for a longer time).

This test is less sensitive to noise (extremely high or low values in the samples) than the *two independent samples means test*, because extreme sample data values increase or decrease both the nominator and the denominator of the fraction in  $t$  formula. But, a small number of extreme values still can skew the test results considerably, because the absolute value of the sample data points are used in computing  $t$ .

Similarly, given a desired false positive rate ( $\alpha$ ) and false negative rate ( $\beta$ ), the required sample size can be calculated by:  $N = \frac{(Z_\alpha + Z_\beta)^2 (2\sigma^2)}{(\mu_b - \mu_i)^2}$  [13]

### C. Two Dependent Samples Means (Paired Wilcoxon) Signed Rank Test

One would expect the network behavior to change through time. For example, a university web server may be busier in specific times of the year (e.g., during the registration period). Nevertheless, one would also expect that the network behavior of a service would be rather similar in two close time periods. The two independent sample t-test does not take advantage of the fact that  $t_i$  (idle time windows) and  $t_b$  (busy time windows) samples are pairwise related. That is, the two independent sample t-test ignores the order of the sample data points. In contrast, the *two dependent samples means t-test* uses this ordering information, but it remains sensitive to noise, because it uses the absolute value of the sample data points in computing  $t$ .

An alternative statistical test that takes pairwise dependency between samples into account is the Wilcoxon test. The Wilcoxon test checks whether or not paired samples of  $t_i$  and  $t_b$  are drawn from the same population. In this approach, we match each  $t_i$  to its consecutive  $t_b$ . In the null hypothesis, we consider  $t_i$ s and  $t_b$ s as samples of the same population. In other words, if service  $S_2$  does not depend on  $S_1$ , delaying requests to service  $S_1$  should not create any changes in the distribution of the requests to  $S_2$ .

To prove that service  $S_2$  depends on service  $S_1$ , it is sufficient to show that the number of requests received on service  $S_2$  at  $t_i$ s does not follow the same distribution as the number of requests received at  $t_b$ s. Because the  $t_i$ s and  $t_b$ s are paired and related, we use Wilcoxon signed-rank test to calculate the z-score for the null hypothesis (that  $t_i$ s and  $t_b$ s belong to the same distribution).

In this test, each  $X^i$  is paired with an  $X^b$  value. The  $k^{th}$  pair is denoted as  $X_k^i, X_k^b$ .  $D_k = |X_k^i - X_k^b|$ ,  $W = |\sum_{k=1}^n \text{sgn}(D_k) \cdot R_k|$ , where  $R_k$  is

the rank of  $D_k$  when the list is sorted in ascending order. A z-score can be computed using  $z = \frac{W-0.5}{\sigma_W}$ , where

$$\sigma_W = \sqrt{\frac{n(n+1)(2n+1)}{6}}$$

It can be shown that if the two distributions are different ( $\mu_i \neq \mu_b$ ),  $D$  has a distribution with a non-zero average.

Please notice that  $H_1 \Rightarrow \mu_i \neq \mu_b \Rightarrow z \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} \infty \Rightarrow \Rightarrow p\text{-value} \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} 0$ .

In other words, regardless of how small the fraction of delayed requests ( $\rho$ ) is, arbitrarily small p-values can be achieved by increasing the length of the experiment (period of time). To validate these analytical results in a real world scenario, we ran simulations varying  $\rho$ ,  $\mu$ , and the length of the experiment. The simulations verified the analysis.

Finally, we report service  $S_2$  to depend on service  $S_1$  if any of the three statistical tests can reject the null hypothesis.

### D. Environment Effects on the Accuracy of the Statistical Tests

There are several factors in a real network environment that can limit the accuracy and power of the proposed statistical tests: low number of requests to the server; low percentage of the requests to the server affected by the delayer; jitter in the network; cached services; overloaded servers; and popular services. Many of these challenges are partially modeled and the proposed statistical framework can address these challenges by increasing the sample size:

*Low number of requests to the server* is directly modeled as small  $\mu$ , which will require higher number of samples for achieving the desired level of accuracy.

*Low percentage of the requests to the server affected by the delayer* is directly modeled by small  $\rho$  which will need a higher number of samples.

*Noise and jitter* cause a fraction of the packets to arrive at a different time than when they were supposed to. By assuming that a percentage of the packets will not be affected by noise and jitter, the effect of noise and jitter on *Rippler* can be modeled by assuming the fraction of packets influenced by the delayer ( $\rho$ ) is small.

*Cached services* can be modeled as a low percentage of packets being delayed by the delayer, because even a cached service is called once in a while.

*Overloaded servers*, or non-responsive services, are equivalent to noise and jitter in the network for an analyzer that only observes the arrival times of the packets, because jitters happen in networks as the relays become overloaded.

*Popular services* (services used by multiple composite services) can be modeled by a low fraction of the requests to the service being delayed by the delayer.

## VI. IMPLEMENTATION

We developed two versions of our delayer: centralized delayer (installed on a bridge) and host-based delayer (installed on hosts). We used our centralized delayer in a small lab network under our control as a prototype. We introduced the

minimal amount of delay that is required to detect perturbations. This delay time should be greater than the clock discrepancy between the delayer and flow collector devices. The clock discrepancy in our network is less than or equal to 40 milliseconds (the computer clocks are synchronized by NTP). We used a delay of 100 milliseconds, which one can expect not to have significant effects on typical services. We are aware that there may exist services for which 100 milliseconds of delay could cause a failure, but these services are usually not implemented in typical TCP/IP networks. These services should have their own dedicated networks as small amounts of delay/jitter are expected in regular networks.

The first packets to each service, when it is its turn, is delayed for 100 milliseconds in a period of 10 seconds, then no service is delayed for 10 seconds, and the next service is delayed afterwards.

In our prototype implementation, we were able to show that the busy and idle time windows ( $t_b$ s and  $t_i$ s) are detectable.

#### A. Installation and Detected Dependencies

We installed our delayer and NetFlow collectors in a university department lab. Unfortunately, the university network administrators were not able to provide us with a central delay injection point in their infrastructure. Therefore, we were forced to deploy our host-based delayer. The delayer was installed in a lab used by students (mainly for doing their assignments and homeworks). To overcome the clock discrepancy between the hosts that run the delayer, we increased the amount of delay from the original 100ms (used in the prototype system) to 500ms (the delay discrepancy between the hosts was around 40ms). A set of 54 most frequently used services were selected to be delayed.

In a normal day, students use the computers in this lab to do their homework. All the machines in the lab are centrally managed (using cfengine) and they have an identical configuration. Users authenticate using an LDAP server, and their home directories are mounted from several NFS servers. Users check and send emails using an internal mail server, and an internal DNS server is used to look up IP addresses. All hosts have an /etc/hosts file that lists all the internal servers' names along with their IP addresses.

Network administrators provided us with a central network data gathering point. The network traffic information is gathered in NetFlow format. We gathered 133GB of NetFlow data which corresponds to 12.5 billion connections. The packets were delayed for 500ms.

In the course of the experiments, we delayed requests to 54 services. We compared our results with three previous approaches. We first present the comparison of our approach to these approaches in Section VII. Later in Section VIII, we describe previous work in dependency detection and compare the characteristics of our approach against the previous work. Table I shows the detected true dependencies using *Rippler*.


### VII. COMPARISON WITH SHERLOCK, ORION, AND NSDMINER

We ran Sherlock [3], Orion [6], and NSDMiner [14] (three passive dependency detection systems) on our NetFlow dataset

**Table I:** The dependency analysis results

service	perturbed services
NFS1	LDAP, web, cfengine, dhcp, portmapper, lab shell, DNS
web26	NFS26, portmapper26
NFS46	LDAP12, LDAP36, NFS13, dhcp10, NFS41
CFengine	NFS1, NetBios, IMAP, NFS2
NFS3	MySQL and NFS4
WWW	NFS1, IMAP, NFS4

**Figure 4:** ROC curves for Rippler, NSDMiner, Orion, and Sherlock



gathered from the department computer lab. The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 4. We ran all four systems with different parameter tunings and calculated the number of false positive and true positives for each tool, and for each configuration. As shown in Figure 4, *Rippler* produces less false positives for any given true positives that it generated. It should be noted that *Rippler* did not generate any false positives when we set the p-value to any value less than or equal to  $10^{-6}$ .

To verify and compare the results, we manually labeled 156 dependencies (the superset of all resulting dependencies from all four tools). The dependencies were confirmed by interviewing the administrators. We also looked into the configuration of the hosts in the lab. As all the hosts share the same configuration, by looking into the host configuration we learned about many dependencies.

In the end, 68 of these 156 dependencies were true dependencies, 70 were false dependencies, and we were not able to determine the correctness of 18 dependencies.

#### A. Sherlock

Sherlock calculates the strength of a dependency relation from service  $S_2$  to service  $S_1$  as the probability that service  $S_1$  accessed within a time interval from when service  $S_2$  is accessed. Among other problems, this approach will detect every pair of frequent services as depending on each other. The results of our experiments verified this property. Sherlock created a large number of false positives, and typically these false positives included the most-frequently-used services.

It should be noted that we recognize the fact that we tested a partial implementation of Sherlock, using only the part that

detects the service dependencies. Sherlock, in addition, uses this information to predict system failures and localize faults.

### B. Orion

Orion exploits the fact that if two services are depending on each other, the delays between consecutive accesses follow some pattern. For example, if an application needs to access service  $S_1$  before accessing service  $S_2$ , the delay between accesses to service  $S_1$  and service  $S_2$  will follow some non-random distribution. Orion uses this property to detect this different distribution from a random distribution. Although Orion has a more compelling confidence measure than Sherlock, it still fails to create high-confidence dependencies. Orion confidence in a dependency relationship is expressed in how different the delay patterns between accesses to the two services are from random, in terms of number of standard deviations. In our experiments, Orion did not generate any dependencies for any confidence higher than 1.5 standard deviations, which corresponds to  $p\text{-value} = 0.1336$ .

### C. NSDMiner

NSDMiner detects only local-remote dependencies. Therefore, it misses remote-remote dependencies. Another problem with NSDMiner is the fact that it is sensitive to the timing information of the sensors. NSDMiner detects a dependency from service A to service B when the probability that the life span of connections to service B is included in the life span of a connection to service A is higher than a threshold. This threshold is called  $\alpha$ . We varied  $\alpha$  from 0 to 1.

In our experiment, the NetFlow probes and the delayer are placed between the lab clients and the servers they use, which are located in a server room. Therefore, most of the traffic from a server to another does not pass our probes and delayers. This property makes the remote-remote dependencies the most common dependencies in our configuration. NSDMiner does not try to detect remote-remote dependencies, and therefore it misses most of the true dependencies in our configuration.


### D. Correlation Does Not Imply Causation

The most common problem with correlation-based approaches for dependency detection is the confusion of correlation with causation. In other words, passive approaches are susceptible to false positives. The experiments showed that the problem exists in the approaches we tested.

For example, the correlation-based approaches detected a dependency from several services to the main DNS server. This dependency is a false positive, because the machines that are used in the experiment have the IP addresses of the hosts in the internal network in their `/etc/hosts` file. Therefore, these hosts do not need to lookup the IP addresses of the internal services. The reason for the false positive is that DNS is one of the most frequently used services in the network, and therefore it appears as the prequel to other services being used. This property of the DNS server has led to false dependencies detected by both Orion and Sherlock. NSDMiner does not detect dependencies to the DNS server, because NSDMiner only detects local-remote dependencies<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup>the dependency between the services and DNS server is usually a remote-remote dependency

**Figure 5:** Distribution of detected ripples in different time slots



### E. Rippler

In the experiment, we excluded the services that did not receive at least 1000 requests in the period of data gathering. We varied  $p$ -value from 1 to  $10^{-20}$ . We experienced some false positives when  $p$ -value was greater than  $10^{-6}$ , but when we reached  $10^{-6}$ , all false positives disappeared.

When we included the idle services (services with less than 1000 requests during the experiment), seven false positives appeared.

We did not expect any false positives from *Rippler*. The reason for this confidence is that when a ripple is detected the probability of it being caused by a random process is negligible (by choosing a small enough  $p$ -value as the threshold). One possible explanation is that the dependency between two services has a long time lag and therefore the delay ripple from the first service arrives late and is considered as the effect of another service.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of the detected ripples among the time slots. Each window of time dedicated to a service is called a period. Each time slice inside a period that is used to detect a ripple is called a time slot. As a period is 20 seconds long and we use 500ms of delay, we have 80 slots in each period (because of using sliding windows). As shown in the figure, the ripples are either in the left side of the period or in the middle of it. Even though most ripples follow this pattern, which is expected from a low-latency dependency, we observe several cases of ripples scattered in random slots. This shows that high-delay dependencies exist among our services. These high-delay dependencies can be the cause of false positives, because they confuse *Rippler* in recognizing which service delay was responsible for the observed delay in the target server. This problem can be easily resolved by dedicating a longer time period to each service.

## VIII. RELATED WORK

Previous work on service dependency detection includes many different approaches. In order to compare the previous



work, we first introduce some desirable effectiveness criteria for a dependency detection approach.

### A. Dependency Detection Effectiveness Metrics

One can expect several properties from an ideal dependency detection system. The dependency detection ideally should: be able to detect direct and indirect dependencies; be able to handle the partial data; affect the network operation minimally; be easy to deploy; be application-independent; require a minimum amount of change to the machines in the network; provide a metric of meaningful confidence; need a minimum amount of high level data; and be able to work with anonymized data.

A dependency-detection approach may or may not detect both local-remote and remote-remote dependencies.

A dependency detection approach may or may not work with partial data. Partial data issues occur when the whole information flow path from the depending service to the depended service is not visible to the system. For example, assume that service  $S_4$  depends on service  $S_3$ , which in turn depends on service  $S_2$ , which finally depends on service  $S_1$ . If the communication between service  $S_2$  and  $S_3$  is hidden from the system, the dependency detection system will not be able to build the entire information flow path between service  $S_1$  and service  $S_4$  and may miss the dependency relationship.

A dependency detection approach can be host-based or network-based, depending on the data source it uses (network traces or system logs). Network based systems are generally easier to deploy.

A dependency detection approach can be application-dependent or application-independent. An application-independent approach works correctly in presence of unknown types of services. On the other hand, the application-dependent approaches need readjustments or reimplementations for different types of services.

A dependency detection approach may or may not provide a measure of confidence for detected dependencies. To have a confidence level for each dependency detection can help the administrators to decide and choose their most important dependencies based on the most reliable information.

And finally, a dependency detection approach may or may not be susceptible to confusing correlation with causation.

### B. Previous Work

NSDMiner [14] is a passive correlation-based dependency-detection system. It looks only for local-remote dependencies by computing the probability of the remote service being requested given the local service being requested.

eXpose [11] is another passive dependency-detection system. It uses JMeasure as a metric for measuring the dependency of two services. eXpose uses statistical rule mining to detect frequent patterns of communication between services. As it detects correlation between services, it is also susceptible to false positives. eXpose needs to see the information flow path between the correlated services and therefore, cannot

handle partial data problem. It also suffers from false positives, because it is a correlation based technique.

Chen et al. [6] developed a passive dependency-detection system called Orion. Orion uses traffic delay distributions to find services that depend on each other. More specifically, Orion looks for spikes in delays of service usage. The delay patterns (spikes) between two independent services are expected to be random, while the delay distribution between two depending services follows some distribution that depends on the execution path of the services. As a correlation detection technique, Orion also suffers from the false positive problem.

Sherlock [3] is a passive host-based dependency-detection system. Sherlock recognizes dependencies between two services only when the same client (on which Sherlock processes are run) directly contacts both services. Therefore, it does not detect local-remote dependencies. Sherlock also suffers false positives, because it detects correlated services as depending.

Pinpoint [5] is a host-based active dependency-detection system that uses system logs to trace the requests across a distributed system. Pinpoint modifies the service under study to generate unique IDs for each request and pass them through the system. Pinpoint is application-dependent, and cannot be used to detect dependencies among unknown services.

Macroscopic [15] is a passive host-based dependency-detection system. It uses system logs to map network connections to different applications/processes. The analyzer aggregates the information gathered on different hosts to extract the dependencies between different applications.

Constellation [2] is a passive dependency-detection system that uses activity correlation as a measure of dependency. It uses statistical hypothesis testing to calculate confidence of the derived dependency relations.

X-Trace [10] is an active dependency-detection system that modifies network protocols to carry X-Trace meta-data. It inserts unique identifiers into the requests and propagates them to the further requests generated by the original one. Then, X-Trace gathers this information and builds a tree structure of the request path.

Kind et al. [12] used a passive correlation-based approach to detect direct and indirect dependencies between different services in a corporate network.

Dechouniotis et al. [9] developed a passive network-based dependency-detection system. They used NetFlow network data, and used a fuzzy inference engine to classify the detected relations as high confidence and low confidence relations.

ADD [1], [4] (Active Dependency Discovery) uses active perturbation to detect dependencies between services. This approach uses a relatively aggressive method as it perturbs different components of the system by load injection. ADD creates some workload on a component in the network and observes its effect on another component. To create appropriate workload for a service, ADD needs to understand the logic of the service. Therefore, ADD is application-dependent. ADD also has problems detecting dependencies to replicated (or load balancing) components, as adding load to one component may not necessarily lead to reduced efficiency of the target service.



**Table II:** Comparison with Dependency Mining Tools *Table column names correspond to the following properties: handling both Local-remote and Remote-remote dependencies (LR), handling Bad Sensor Placement (SP), No modification to the Hosts (NH), No extra Traffic injected (NT), Application Independence (AI), Not Confusing Correlation with Causation (NCC). A 'Y' means that the corresponding system handles the corresponding problem, and an 'N' means that it fails to completely handle the corresponding problem.*

Approach	LR	SP	NH	NT	AI	NCC
NSDminer [14]	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
eXpose [11]	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Orion [6]	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Sherlock [3]	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Pinpoint [5]	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
Macroscopic [15]	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Constellation [2]	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
X-Trace [10]	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
ADD [4]	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
<i>Rippler</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

In summary, all previous passive approaches are susceptible to confusing correlation with causation. Therefore, all previous passive approaches have high false positive rates (compared to active approaches). However, all previous active approaches are application-dependent, cannot be used to detect dependencies among unknown services, and they need to be customized for different services.

Table II shows and compares the features of the previous work in service dependency detection. *Rippler* is, to the best of our knowledge, the first application-independent active dependency-detection system.

We selected Sherlock, Orion, and NSDMiner to evaluate the performance of our system. We did not choose any of the three previous active approaches (Pinpoint, X-Trace, and ADD), because all these approaches are application-dependent. In other words, they either require modification of the applications (Pinpoint and X-Trace) under-study, or need to know details about the application protocols (ADD).

## IX. LIMITATIONS

*Rippler* needs to be able to delay the traffic to the servers under-study at specific times. This requires the delayer component to be placed between the services and their corresponding clients. In other words, *Rippler* cannot verify or reject dependencies between two services if it is not able to delay requests to either of them.

Another limitation of *Rippler* is that because each service gets delayed in specific time windows, *Rippler* should know the set of under-study services beforehand.

*Rippler* is only able to detect the types of dependencies that conserve delay patterns. For example, a backup or load-distribution dependency would not be detected.

## X. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we presented a new application-independent active approach (*Rippler*) to detect dependencies among services using traffic watermarking. We analytically showed that *Rippler* can achieve arbitrarily low false positives if provided with large enough data sets. We compared *Rippler*

with previous dependency-detection systems using a set of general effectiveness criteria for these systems. Furthermore, we applied *Rippler* to a real-world network, and compared its results with three previous systems and showed that *Rippler* outperformed those systems.

## XI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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